The Environmental Turning Point:
Transcending a Movement to the Fourth Wave & Beyond

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When one speaks of environmentalism, more precisely the environmental movement, hidden in these catchphrases is the depth and breath of a rising social force (Hawken, 2007). Generally the term the "environmental movement" has come to represent a social movement that attempts to address environmental issues, such as acid rain, whaling and deforestation. However, the environmental movement is unlike any other social movement. For this movement not only champions causes and attempt to resolves problematic conditions, it has also become a global momentum affecting almost every sector of our society, while challenging humans very conception of their world and relationship with that world (Shabecoff, 2003). However, some have come to question in recent years whether conventional environmentalism is coming to an end, deemed no longer effective at addressing the most serious ecological crisis of our time, that of climate change (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2004). While the movement has had some victories, such as air and water pollution legislation in the United States and Canada, as well as the Montreal Protocol guarding against ozone depleting chemicals, the same tried and tested strategies and campaigning by environmentalists is no longer obtaining the same results when it comes to climate change (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2004). Therefore, it is the assertion of this paper that the environmental movement must evolve if it is to thrive in the 21st century, effecting social change as it once did.

When we speak of evolution, it is important to recognize that the environmental movement has already experienced various points of evolution throughout its over two hundred year history. From its first wave in the late 18th to early 19th centuries where elite naturalists and hunters constructed the park system in North America protecting "wild" lands from the Industrial Revolution; evolving then into the second wave in the 1960's to 1970's where the Cold War nuclear arms brought about an anti-establishment youth culture in the West that tackled some mega-issues, such as nuclear testing and whaling; and then again evolving into the third wave in the 1980's to 1990's where environmentalism was not just the fight of the West, but globally with grassroots, and at times radical, groups spanning across the Global South to the Global North tackling an assortment of issues. However, some argue the environmental movement's evolution has grown stagnant since the early millennia, as corporate prowess expanded with the Bush administration and free-market policies adopted increasingly by world governments (Shabecoff, 2003). This is why, according to an interview with Philip Shabecoff, a journalist and

historian of the environmental movement, a fourth wave of environmentalism would be necessary, a wave that has not been ignited as of yet, according to him (Shabecoff, Personal Interview, June 30, 2011). However, this is a point of disagreement, as it is the position of this paper that the fourth wave movement does exist, as it emerged in 2006 and into the present. Becoming the next point of evolution for the movement, as it has become a transnational climate force responding to global climate change, the most challenging environmental issue humankind has faced. That being stated, while the fourth wave existed it has been short lived, with the trends of an end in recent years. Thus, the discussion of the next evolution of the environmental movement is pertinent. For as Philip Shabecoff said in his comprehensive historical book *A Fierce Green Fire*: *The American Environmental Movement* (2003) that "environmentalism, despite its limited successes, offers the best hope that we will be able to save ourselves from the grave dangers we have created by our destructive use of the natural world" (p. xiv).

Henceforth, this paper presents an in-depth analysis of the evolution of the environmental movement with discussion into its possible next evolutionary progression. To adequately present our argument, this paper begins with part one, a historical overview of the environmental movement from the late 18th century to the early 1990's. Following in the second part is a discussion into the fourth wave existence, making the case that the fourth wave did exist and portraying its characteristics, driving influences, and significant events. Lastly, the third part of this paper presents an important contribution into the discussion of the environmental movement, an analysis into the future of environmentalism with arguments for how the movement could evolve into a significant social force effecting mass social change. This research has made use of several interviews with key environmental leaders, historians, and academics; as well as, extensive field notes and participant observation over the last three years; alongside numerous books, news articles and peer-reviewed academic works.

However, it must be noted that within this research there are specific focuses and conscious omissions. One major focus of this research is that it is regionally specific of North America. While environmentalism does not necessarily begin and certainly does not end in North America, this region has had significant influence on the environmental movement, especially in the Untied States. Furthermore, the passages of these pages discuss the environmental movement

holistically, as a singular, all encompassing movement. While there are many sub-movements, or rather sister movements, that do not necessarily identity themselves as part of the conventional environmental movement, such as the environmental justice and climate justice movements, within this paper we speak of the movement as a singular entity with diverse, and at times, opposing identities, such as the mainstream organizations (i.e. Greenpeace) vs. the grassroots groups (i.e. Rising Tide). As well, it should be noted that while the evolution of the environmental movement is divided into four waves, there is some dispute amongst varying historians and scholars as to when the waves occurred and the number of waves that existed, but for the purposes of our research we are using the timeline by Philip Shabecoff (2003) and adding into that discussion the fourth wave. Lastly, this is by no means a complete analysis of the environmental movement, as the movement is far too complex and great a force to provide a full historical account within this research paper. Therefore, solely an overview is provided, highlighting some of the key individuals, events, organizations and influences over the movement's two hundred year evolution.

Part I: History of The Environmental Movement

First Wave: Late 18th to Early 19th Century

The birth of the environmental movement began in the woods of North America and the gardens of Britain. For in the beginning of the 18th century to the late 19th century, the first wave of the movement took shape by responding to the sudden transformation of the New World and Old World brought on by the Industrial Revolution, attempting to maintain some essence of the original lands (Pak, 2011; Shabecoff, 2003). In North America, this transformation was drastic, for as Shabecoff states: "Nowhere else in the world did the (Industrial) Revolution take place as quickly and completely as it id in the Untied States…Nowhere did the landscape more quickly become degraded as a result of that revolution" (p. 26) Further exacerbating the degraded lands, the post-Civil War era was a period of explosive geographical expansion and industrial growth. With lumbering as the nation's most important industry in this era, reckless exploitation of the regions forests had left most of New England, New York and Great Lakes Region in North America bare, with the industry moving its ax to other woodlands (Pak, 2011; Shabecoff, 2003). This industrial assault that took a hold of the last of the frontier awoke a collective of early pioneers of the movement in North America. While in Britain, a response to the Industrial era and a love affair with gardens blossomed Europe's own environmental movement (Cronon, 1996).

To focus on the North American environmental movement specifically, among the early pioneers of this movement were hunters, fisherman, sportsman and naturalists (Shabecoff, 2003), those who spent a greater time in the wilderness and witnessed the demise of certain species and their habitat. The protection of public lands therefore became the cause of this first pulse in environmentalism and it soon found its first voices. John Muir (1838-1914), an influential naturalist writer, fathered the philosophical school of preservationism in the movement; a biocentric perspective that holds the position that nature exists for its own sake and should be left untouched by civilization, what some critics call the "cult of nature" with its spiritual and romanticism tendencies (Pak, 2011; Shabecoff, 2003). With this perspective in mind and his anger over the degradation of Yosemite Valley in the Sierra Nevada, Muir and others began a

lobbying campaign to establish Yosemite as a federal park, one of the first federal parks in the United States, which succeeded in 1890. Two years later, Muir became the president of the Sierra Club, the first environmental organization with the aim of being a permanent civil society to protect natural areas (Pak, 2011; Shabecoff, 2003). According to Michael S. Pak (2011), Muir transformed what was a small artistic and philosophical collective, that of naturalists, into the beginning of the first wave movement (p.6), that of an organized amateur crusade to preserve what was left of the unspoiled American landscape (Shabecoff, 2003).

However, another philosophical school emerged at this time; that of conservation lead by Gifford Pinchot (1865-1946), a forester and politician who became the first Chief of the United State Forest Service (Pak, 2011; Shabecoff, 2003). Pinchot, who was called the "father of conservation," believed that nature should be used wisely and efficiently (what is now called "wise-use"), but that nature is merely resources to be used for the benefit of humans. This anthropocentric perspective was in stark contrast to the preservationist beliefs of Muir that of the dominant the principals of the first wave and conservationism would not take hold of the environmental movement until later (Pak, 2011). However, this began what Pak (2011) argues caused a long history and split in the movement that continues to this day - the debate between preservationist vs. conservationist; biocentric vs. anthropocentric or as Pak describes, "Arcadian vs. Utilitarian."

Examining beyond dualities, political ecology theory argues, "nature will *always* be contested terrain" (Cronon, 1996, p. 52). According to William Cronon (1996): nature is a human construction, how one perceives the natural world just as the human world exists in a cultural, historical, geographical and political context and cannot be understood apart from that context. Hence, as people have differences in their beliefs so too their understanding of the natural world and how it should be treated differ. A point in case is Muir and Pinchot, who were formerly friends but grew to be famous enemies with the controversy over the damming of the Hetch Hetchy Valley, a debate over the wise-use of parts of Yosemite vs. a battle cry for preserving wilderness (Cronon, 1996; Pak, 2011). Moreover, Cronon argues that the very idea of wilderness can be the origins to environmental ills. For it constructs a human vs. nature dichotomy and as long as so-called "nature" exists outside of the human world, an "untouched" and "unspoiled"

Eden outside of civilization as it is considered, there is no responsibility for it. Therefore, a "middle ground" must be established, according to Cronon, where both the human and natural world exist, where civilization and so-called wilderness co-exist, where we realize the environment in which we actually live within and materialize a better world for this existence and not an imagined place.

Perhaps Theodore Roosevelt was that initial bridge, as his work, it could be argued, attempted to bridge these two schools of early environmentalism. Roosevelt (1858-1919) was considered the first environmental president, as he made protection of federal lands a centerpiece of his presidency (Shabecoff, 2003). Influenced by the writing and friendship of Muir, he pursued spiritual refuge with the wilderness, but persuaded by the political council of Pinchot, conservationism ruled in policy-making. Together these three men and the bridge between them accomplished great strides for the initial environmental cause, setting forth legislation that preserved the early national parks, established federal agencies, such as Forest Services to better manage resources and the Sierra Club, the first environmental group to engage civil society in environmental protection (Dunlap & Mertig, 1991; Shabecoff, 2003). While protection of parks had been at work before these men, such as in 1872 when Congress set aside two million acres of land to be safeguarded as the Yellowstone National Park (Shabecoff, 2003), they were however some of the first leaders of the first wave in the environmental movement. But that movement would come to sudden end with World War I, followed by the Great Depression and World War II (Dunlap & Mertig, 1991; Pak, 2011; Shabecoff, 2003). The environmental pulse would not beat for over four decades, silenced by war and economic recession, a story that is often repeated in the waves to come.

Second Wave: 1960's – 1970's

With the sight of a mushroom cloud from the nuclear blast that hit Hiroshima, another bomb had simultaneously been set off that of a "mind bomb" - as Greenpeace co-founder, Robert Hunter once said - into the human consciousness that dramatically alerted western society (Hunter, 1979; Pak, 2011). It was a simple idea, but one that was realized with the Hiroshima image, the idea of self-destruction that was not only possible, but imminent. That idea alone

awoke the pulse of the second wave of environmentalism. The wave began in the 1960's as an emerging anti-nuclear movement in response to the Cold War era, attempting to end nuclear testing and weaponry. However, in many ways it was born more out of fear for personal safety than anger for the despoliation of the environment (Shabecoff, 2003), which started the intersection of social justice with environmentalism, something that would come to grow in strength in later waves. Combined with the social unrest and campus revolts of the 1960's, the environmental movement became intertwined as one of many causes of the counter-culturalism revolution. Meanwhile, for the first time it reached a scale never achieved before, a mass social movement accepted by the mainstream public, spanning across the United States and Canada.

More than anyone else, Rachel Carson (1907-1964) is credited for sparking the second wave of environmentalism (Shabecoff, 2003), as her book *Silent Spring* (1962) tapped into the fear and anger that had been building in the public over nuclear weaponry, according to Pak (2011). Although the book focused on drawing a link between the effects of pesticides on the environment to human health, Carson also showed parallels between DDT and strontium-90, the controversial radioactive isotope from nuclear fallout (Pak, 2011). Shabecoff argues that prior to Carson, environmentalism was a disjointed, inchoate impulse that was waiting for its manifesto – *Silent Spring* was that manifesto (p. 99). By clearly demonstrating how the destruction of nature and threats to human health are intertwined, the book fundamentally altered the concept of the human vs. nature duality, that we are somehow separate from the environment, and was the rallying call for a generation to end needless destruction, even if solely for their own sake. Therefore, Pinchot's conservationism philosophy dominated the early part of the second wave (Pak, 2011), as the anti-nuclear and pesticide issues proved environmentalism need not be solely a cause of protecting nature for nature's sake, but protecting nature for human's sake as well. However, conservationism too was changing for the times, as Pak argues, conservation, or as he calls it "utilitarianism" would not attempt to conquer nature, since Hiroshima proved this could be extremely detrimental, rather to use the advances from science and technology to "refit and reconfigure human civilization… to be better sustained by nature" (p.7).

It would not be just science and technology playing a new role in the movement; other new tactics and new groups were emerging. A prominent new organization that answered the calls of

Carson and Hiroshima was Greenpeace, otherwise known in its earlier days as Don't Make a Wave Committee. It was at first a loose group of Quakers, hippies, draft dodgers and ex-journalists that began in Vancouver, Canada (Hunter, 1979). Their first campaign set sail to Amchitka in the Aleutian Islands of Alaska in 1969, planting themselves on "ground-zero" of a U.S. nuclear test site in order to call awareness to the needless destruction the blast could potentially have on the islands if earthquakes erupted in response. Unsuccessful at first, their campaign drew wide spread attention with their use of media and their tactic of direct action. Greenpeace was a pioneering force in those days, understanding the power of dramatic images and video at the beginning of a media culture to change the public's attitudes and ideas, meanwhile mastering peaceful direct action, that of targeting those responsible for the problem and attempting to end their destructive practices through civil disobedience (Hunter, 1979). As a result, soon after their campaign ended the U.S. closed the nuclear testing off the Alaskan coast. However, Greenpeace's use of direct action, even though peaceful, they were labeled as "radicals" (Scarce, 2006). Radicals would become a new strand in environmentalism, loosely defined as groups of individuals that used more controversial and riskier tactics than that of the mainstream environmentalists. While Greenpeace was far more pragmatic than the radicals of today, such as Earth First! or Sea Shepherd (to be discussed later), it did begin a new debate within the movement. Instead of a debate over preservationist vs. conservationists, there was now a debate over radicalism vs. mainstream, many siding with the more radical.

Groups like the Sierra Club and the Audubon Societies had become the "old guard" by the second wave (Scarce, 2006; Shabecoff, 2003). John Muir's club had subsided in the 1920's and 1930's into a passive social organization that sponsored hikes and stayed out of public issues (Shabecoff, 2003). Despite being somewhat reinvigorated by David Browner in the 1950's, they and others had become the "mainstream" environmentalists. The mainstream, labeled as such because of their greater scale, both financially and in employment, as well as, in their use of tactics that included lobbying, research and writing – otherwise called "armchair activism" (Scarce, 2006; Shabecoff, 2003). Groups like Greenpeace grew out of a distain for the mainstream environmentalists; they believed they were behind the times, ignoring the issues that were most pertinent to the second wave - such as pollution, "nukes" and other emerging environmental threats - and were unwilling to evolve using new tools. There was suddenly a

"whole new agenda," as Michael McCloskey said, then executive director of the Sierra Club in 1989 in Shabecoff's book (p. 110).

For Greenpeace, the new agenda began to evolve for them as well from strictly being an anti-nuclear group to a multi-issue environmental organization with its hopes of becoming global. The organization was re-named Greenpeace under the direction of its first president, Robert Hunter (1941-2005), an ex-journalist turned hippie, who led the group in their first anti-whaling campaigns against Russian whalers off the Pacific Ocean (Hunter, 1979). In strict contrast to the anti-nuclear anthropocentric tendencies, Hunter, who many considered the "spiritual leader of Greenpeace," brought back biocentric principals to the movement, believing that nature should be protected for its own sake (Watson, 2006). Whales were the symbol of biocentrism. They were legendary creatures whose intelligence was possibly beyond our own; we had romantic affinity towards them and these large mammals came to represent the fate of the natural world at the hands of humans (Shabecoff, 2003). Many of the great whales were endangered by the middle of the twentieth century, including the blue whale, humpback and right whale, all for oil and meat products of dying industries.

Nevertheless, whether it was pollution, anti-nukes or saving whales – a new movement was flourishing. Perhaps more than at any time, environmentalism became a fully-fledged mass social movement on April 22, 1970 – the first Earth Day celebration (Dunlap & Mertig, 1991: Pak, 2011; Shabecoff, 2003). Some 20 million Americans came together across the country, many of them young, to demonstrate their concern for the environment and celebrate it by planting trees, picking up litter, playing music and wearing flowers in their hair (Pak, 2011; Shabecoff, 2003). However, Canada would not celebrate Earth Day till 1990 (Earth Day, 2011). That same year the Environmental Protection Agency opened up for business, the U.S. federal agency charged with the protection of human health and the environment (no doubt influenced by the words of Carson), as well, a cascade of environmental legislation flowed from Capitol Hill during the 1970's, including the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act (Shabecoff, 2003). New departments, agencies and boards for protecting the environment proliferated at the state, municipal and in many cases, even town level. The environmental movement had become popular and accepted by the mainstream by 1970.

Increasingly television programs showcased nature and wildlife; people were altering their food habits and lifestyles, seeking communes in nature and banning pesticides; many sectors of society were becoming altered including law. Environmental law became the fastest growing sector of the American bar; a burst of environmental activism occurred after the first Earth Day; new groups were growing like weeds while groups like Greenpeace were expanding its member base substantially; and for a time, the very consciousness of western civilization was being changed (Shabecoff, 2003). Shabecoff argued: Environmentalism, once regarded as the self-serving indulgence of a few privileged elite, became the public's cause in the States (and Canada) (p. 106). The environmental movement had arrived.

However, as Riley E. Dunlap and Angela G. Mertig argue in *The Evolution of the U.S. Environmental Movement from 1970 to 1990: An Overview* (1991), the acceptability of the environment became its own detriment. According to the "natural history" model in sociological theory, when a social movement becomes successful through gaining enough support to generate social change, it becomes institutionalized and typically looses momentum (Dunlap & Mertig, 1991). A movement becomes institutionalized when solutions are achieved through new government regulations and agencies, such as what happened to the environmental movement in the 1970's. The media and public attention dwindles as they assume the problems are being taken care of, as expressed with slowed growth rate by most environmental organizations and several, especially on the local level, altogether disappearing by the mid-1970's (Dunlap & Mertig, 1991). As well, a co-opting of environmental groups and leaders occurs when they work with government, leading to in-fighting and fragmentation, exemplified in the case of Greenpeace when the group received a tax break by the Canadian government and slowly rejected its more radical content (Dunlap & Mertig, 1991; Anonymous, 2003). For example, co-founder Paul Watson, considered the black sheep for such antics as throwing a club used to kill seals into the freezing Newfoundland ice floes and potentially causing legal consequences for the group, was expelled by Greenpeace (Anonymous, 2003). The expelling of Watson led him to become a new radical, a strand that emerged increasingly later in third wave, and later founding his own organization called the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society in 1977 using more controversial tactics than Greenpeace (to be discussed later). Greenpeace on the other hand

would become the new mainstream with its greater scale and by becoming institutionalized, signifying the end of the second wave by the mid-1970's.

Third Wave: Late 1980's – Early 1990's

During the 1980's, Ronald Regan's anti-environmental administration rekindled the fire of environmentalism. His free market policies and appointees that represented industry frustrated the public, ironically provoking the rise of the third wave of the movement by the end of 1980's (Dunlap & Mertig, 1991; Shabecoff, 2003). In this process, the environmental movement avoided its own demise that seemed imminent by the late 1970's, something few social movements have accomplished, according to Dunlap and Mertig (1991). However, this new wave could not be characterized as responding to one or two issues of its time---a whole new assortment of issues had arisen thanks to more complex and problematic conditions that had surfaced. This included toxic waste, acid rain, the ozone hole, rainforest deforestation, and newfound science on climate change (Shabecoff, 2003). As well, traumatic events occurred during the third wave giving call to action, such as Love Canal, Three Mile Island, the Bhopal tragedy and the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Meanwhile, a variety of new tactics and groups emerged. Henceforth, if there was one thing that could describe the third wave, it was diversity. Even diversity in scale, for by the 1980's the movement was no longer a western phenomenon, it had become global with grassroots groups on almost every continent in the world (Shabecoff, 2003).

Environmentalism was popular again. There was a "Greening of Hollywood," as a 1989 *Time* article stated with actors and rock stars lending their names to various causes; eco-journalism had become an established career with the formation of the Society of Environmental Journalists in 1990; and many of the environmental groups that had survived the Regan attacks of the 1980's emerged bigger and stronger than before (Shabecoff, 2003). National and local environmental groups experienced unprecedented growth in its memberships and donations, as a response to Regan's anti-environmental presidency (Dunlap & Mertig, 1991; Shabecoff, 2003). By 1990, groups like Greenpeace U.S. had two million members; its new headquarters in Amsterdam had gross revenue of $100 million, while internationally there were offices in twenty-three nations with over 400 full time employees (Scarce, 2006). Earth Day as well had gone from 20 million

participants in the U.S. in 1970 to 200 million globally in 141 countries in 1990 (Shabecoff, 2003). In this expansion, the third wave had become professionalized and as Shabecoff stated, "were more inclined to cooperate with existing political and economic forces to achieve their goals" (p. 248). Tactics, such as direct confrontation, litigation and lobbying were seen as the "old guard" (what was park keeping to the second wave), instead the third wavers endorsed market based approaches such as credits for cutting pollution or imposing taxes on certain industries, as well as technological solutions, such as wind power generation (Shabecoff, 2003).

However, not everyone agreed with these new tactics and the professionalizing of the movement. A small but growing new radical fringe awoke in response to what they considered the compromising and failures of the mainstream (Dunlap & Mertig, 1991; Shabecoff, 2003). As an activist insider summarized in *Do or Die: Voices from the Ecological Resistance* (2003): "Environmentalism was given a seat at the table but the talk was not of nature but of compromise, techno-fixes and corporate greenwash. Assimilation" (p. 3). These new radicals charge the mainstream groups like Greenpeace with anthropocentrism, caring more about human welfare than of nature; of pursued monetary contributions and recognition over effecting social change; that their tactics were more symbolic and stunt-based than a serious threat the juggernauts of destruction (Anonymous, 2003; Shabecoff, 2003). Moreover, the new radical, typically identified by their tactics, used a new set of tools for change in the third wave. What was controversial in the 1970's was no longer controversial by the 1980's and instead radicalism was taken a step further, as exemplified by Sea Shepherd who sabotaged whaling and fishing vessels through collisions and sinking.

One of the most prominent new radical groups was Earth First! This group formed in 1980 after five friends who had distaste for the mainstream conceived of a new group built on a "no-compromise" principal (Anonymous, 2003; Shabecoff, 2003). They chose to instead defend nature with eco-sabotage (otherwise called "monkey-wrenching"), as romanticized by the novelist Edward Abbey, with illegal actions of windows smashed, trees spiked, computers scrapped, and billboards subverted. As well as using direct action, however taking this tactic a step further than the Greenpeace radicals of the second wave, as they would perform occupations of offices and tree sits in forests often for weeks to months, sometimes years. Earth First! along

with many of the new radicals, were militant biocentrists, adhering to the philosophy of deep ecology, a belief founded by Arne Naess that asserts all life has intrinsic rights equal to those of human beings (Anonymous, 2003; Shabecoff, 2003). While for the Earth First!, their main cause was defending the forests of the Northwest, specifically in Oregon, their tactics and philosophy soon spread elsewhere championing other causes, such as in 1991 when Earth First! UK was founded bent on ending road expansion in Britain and rainforest destruction elsewhere (Anonymous, 2003).

The movement was spreading globally, particularly by a whole new generation of grassroots activists (Dunlap & Mertig, 1991; Shabecoff, 2003). This represented a new strand in the movement. Just as there were radical and mainstream environmentalists, with the third wave there now was the grassroots, community-oriented organizers that represented what Shabecoff calls "a rising unnoticed tide of activism in the developing countries" (p. 186). They were the victims of many environmental assaults by western nations and were not standing by idle, despite popular belief. Some were coming together to discuss and respond to ecological and economic conditions that were equally intertwined and oppressed them (Shabecoff, 2003). Of course, nobody knows how many are involved in grassroots environmentalists around the world, many would not identify themselves as such, but some estimate the numbers to be in the tens of thousands, possible in the millions (Hawken, 2007; Shabecoff, 2003). Their voices, while usually subverted, are expressed in Chico Mendes who was willing to die to save the rubber tree in the Amazon rainforest and with the Chipko villagers in India who were the original "tree-huggers," using their bodies to shield trees from being chain sawed (Shabecoff, 2003).

Back in North America, the grassroots was taking hold of local communities as well, but in an entirely new movement of its own, that of the environmental justice movement. Considered by many as a "sister movement" to the conventional environmental movement, it was a distinct force to the mainstream organizations as environmental justice was the intersection of social justice with environmental issues (Dawson, 2010; Gauna, 2008). Growing out a response to the failure of the mainstream environmentalists to address inner-city issues of the poor and minority communities, as they were not considered "environmental" even thought they included issues of toxicity and pollution (Dawson, 2010; Shabecoff, 2003). Thus, it was the most disempowered

such as the global grassroots that took a stand for themselves and began environmental justice. This sister movement was first sparked 1982 when a largely African American community in rural Warren County, North Carolina mobilized against the building of a toxic waste landfill near their homes (Dawson, 2010). Their protest inspired a series of studies that proved that race, above all, was the primary factor for the location of toxic waste, a type of "eco-racism" (Dawson, 2010; Shabecoff, 2003). One study by the Urban Environment Council in 1984 found that "minorities are the targets of a disproportionate threat of toxins, both in their workplace, where they are assigned the dirtiest and most hazardous jobs, and in their homes, which tend to be situated in the most polluted communities" (Shabecoff, 2003, p. 233-234). With this growing realization of eco-racism and the continued failure in the mainstream organizations to address these concerns, community organizers who typically sought economic reprieve for the poor and minorities began to include the environment on their agenda (Shabecoff, 2003). By the 1990's, the environmental justice movement had blossomed with sprouting grassroots groups across North America that included a diversity of people never before. Unlike the national and international environmental groups whose staff by the 1990's were still predominantly well-educated, relatively affluent, middle-class Caucasian elites – members of the grassroots cut across class, racial, gender, political, religious and education lines, including African America, Indigenous Peoples, Hispanic, minorities, blue-collar and the poor (Dunlap & Mertig, 1991; Shabecoff, 2003).

By the end of the 1980's, environmentalism had spread across all divides, to every continent with numerous philosophies, groups, tactics, sub-sections and strands. Many could not be described here within this research but include: Not In My Backyard (NIMBY), eco-feminists, animal liberation and social ecology to name a few. However, as Dunlap and Mertig ask: Is this diversity strength or weakness to the movement? Some would argue it is a weakness as the diversity can lead to divisions and fragmentation, which can bring about the demise of the movement (Dunlap & Mertig, 1991). As has been noted, various factions are eager to blame others for the failures of the environmental movement and engage in counter-productive behavior, such as in-fighting, political squabbling, verbal attacking and public embarrassment. Some would argue the divisions are the beginning of the end, as an old proverb goes: "united we stand, divided we fall." For Shabecoff argues that if two major forces of the movement, the

mainstream and the grassroots could form a coalition together this would amount to a powerful entity stretched across the national and local scale that could dramatically alter the political landscape if harnessed. Unfortunately the divisions make this type of coalition impossible (Shabecoff, 2003).

However, Dunlap and Mertig offer an alternative argument, stating that the diversity of the movement is its strength. According to them, "the increased diversity has allowed environmentalism to fill (and create) many niches within our society and, as in nature, increased diversity may lead to greater resiliency in this social movement" (p. 215). While divisions can be potentially self-destructive, they argue that these kinds of conflicts have been a part of the movement since its inception with Muir and Pinchot (Dunlap & Mertig, 1991). Also, as seen within this research, these conflicts also gave birth to a cornucopia of new groups, tactics and philosophies that assisted in the evolution of the movement throughout time. As well, Shabecoff points out that these different camps in many ways need each other, for example, the mainstream groups win legislative battles, which provided political legitimacy for the grassroots group's cause. Furthermore, Dunlap and Mertig state that: "despite all of their differences, the various types of environmentalism share recognition of the deteriorating state of the environment, a desire to halt such deterioration, and an opposition to those who foster it" (p. 215). Lastly, they both note that the diversity provides the movement with more resources and personnel that will allow it to continue on into the thirtieth Earth Day, which happened in the year 2000 (Dunlap & Mertig, 1991).

Similar to every wave before it there is a peak moment for the third wave – that peak was the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro (Shabecoff, 2003). During the third wave, it had become increasingly clear that environmental and economic crises were interwoven and because of this a popular term had emerged called "sustainable development," the new face of Pinchot's conservationism (Pak, 2011). Loosely defined as finding the balance between equitable economic growth for the Global North and the Global South alike, while ensuring that growth enhances rather than depletes resources and the natural world (Shabecoff, 2003). There are of course critics of sustainable development who charge that the idea is an oxymoron, there would only increase development but at the expense of sustainability. However, in the early 1990's the

Earth Summit had a mission of achieving a global treaty on realizing sustainable development with a hundred heads of state in attendance (Shabecoff, 2003). As Shabecoff said: "for a time, it seemed as if an alliance of rich and poor nations to safeguard their common future might be within reach" (p. 190). He notes that it was a rare moment of peace: the long Cold War was coming to a close; democratic governments were springing up in Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America and Asia; wars were ending in the Middle East and Northern Ireland; apartheid ended unexpectedly and peacefully in South Africa; meanwhile, concern over the environment and poverty was on the rise globally (Shabecoff, 2003). It seemed possible that a new system could be built in this moment altering humans from their destructive path. However, it would not come to pass.

President George H. W. Bush declined to sign the treaty, making the U.S. the only nation to do so and being the world's most powerful nation ensured the failure of the Earth Summit (Shabecoff, 2003). After the Earth Summit, the third wave had hit its peak and was now ending. Sustainable development all but disappeared from government's agenda and the public consciousness. Instead of a new era of economic and environmental welfare, giant steps were taken backwards: financial assistance to the Global South declined in the 1990's; violence and wars emerged again in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa and the Balkans; economic globalization and libertarianism increased concentration of wealth and power to a select few; industry came to control political affairs and influence the electoral process through campaign contributions, corrupting democracy; and the natural environment faced accelerated degradation with substantial increases in carbon dioxide emissions, clearing of tropical rainforests, over fishing, and so on (Shabecoff, 2003).

To add insult to injury the presidency of the second Bush, George W. Bush began a new onslaught of anti-environmental governance in the dawn of the new millennia, more effective at hindering the movement than the Regan administration. What was described by many as a "hostile corporate takeover," the Bush administration soon became synonymous with crony capitalism, for Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney had both served previously as executive directors of companies affiliated with the oil industry and seemed to have those interest at the top of their political agenda without any regard for environmental welfare. Together they

deregulated environmental protection laws; had closed door meetings on U.S. energy policy with the energy industry (needless to say such policies only increased fossil fuel development), appointed anti-environmentalists with vested interests in key positions, such as in the Environmental Protection Agency; while Bush snubbed the World Summit in South Africa and rejected the Kyoto protocol, the first global climate treaty (Shabecoff, 2003). The third wave was not only dead, but the environmental movement itself was being threatened with a counter-revolution. However, it was not until one traumatic event that movement was threatened from ever emerging again – the 9-11 terrorist attack (Shabecoff, 2003). Shabecoff feared that the environmental movement may never survive the new era of war and environmental disconnect that was to come.

Part II: The Forth Wave Environmental Movement

There was no certain future for environmentalism by the early millennia. Many believed the movement was coming to its end (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2004; Shabecoff, 2003). With the hostile political climate of the Bush administration, stagnant environmental politics and single-issue campaigns no longer gaining the same traction with the public – some argued the environmental movement was "running up against its ability to achieve social change" (Shabecoff, 2003, p. 292). According to *The Death of Environmentalism*, a controversial report written by Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, this was because "environmentalism was no longer capable of dealing with the world's most serious ecological crisis" – climate change (2004, p. 6). That is why Philip Shabecoff called for a fourth wave of environmentalism to deal with climate change and other pressing environmental matters, a wave that was greater in scale, more powerful in political realms and began to use new tools and tactics for change (Shabecoff, 2003, p. 292). However, in an interview with Shabecoff, he contests that the fourth has not come to pass as of yet (Shabecoff, Personal Interview, June 30, 2011). This is a point of disagreement within this discussion, for it is the position of this paper that the fourth wave has arrived, propelled by a sense of urgency with greater awareness of climate change. It became a wave that was broader in scope, searching beyond single issues and into root causes, becoming an era of alliance-building and morphing into a transnational movement that was second only to the human rights transnational movement (Xie, 2011). Therefore, this section of the paper presents the case for the fourth wave's existence.

The Spark

Perhaps more than anyone else Al Gore is credited for sparking the fourth wave of environmentalism (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2011). Al Gore's film *An Inconvenient Truth* was like Rachel Carson's book *Silent Spring* for the fourth wave. It created a "mind bomb" awakening, as Robert Hunter would say, but this time it was a climate-bomb awakening. The film first premiered in January 2006 at the Sundance Film Festival, showcasing Gore's power-point slideshow that clearly illustrates the science of climate change and dramatic consequences if we fail to act. Perhaps a simple concept for an environmental film, but following its release the

documentary became a global media sensation with millions of people screening the film around the world (Nolan, 2010). *An Inconvenient Truth* was later awarded an Oscar in 2007, while in the same year Gore was awarded the Nobel Prize for creating a worldwide understanding on the issue (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2011). However, part of the success of the film was rooted in the fact that the subject resonated with people. The question over alterations to the earth's atmosphere had been raised for the public after increasing scientific information had been presented and several natural disasters had occurred in the years before the film premiered, that of the brutal heat waves of the summer of 2003 in Europe that left 31,000 people dead (Hertsgaard, 2011) and Hurricane Katrina that hit New Orleans the hardest in August 2005, killing nearly 3,000 people – mostly lower- income, African American communities in the Lower Ninth Ward, showcasing the disproportionate ways climate change exacerbated inequalities (Dawson, 2010).

Climate Change is nothing new of course. Dr. James Hansen, head of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and often described as the "father of climate change science," had first made the public aware of the threat of global warming in 1988 when he testified before Congress (Dawson, 2010; Shabecoff, 2003). He boldly told the Senate committee that climate change was not a distant threat but a reality already upon us (Dawson, 2010). According to Hansen, a safe limit of carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere would be no more than 350 parts per million (Dawson, 2010). Currently, the world concentration stands at 393 parts per million, signaling the Earth is already in a state of anthropogenic climate change (CO2 Now, 2011). This was proven with events like Katrina and the European heat waves, however, what contributed to galvanizing the public on the issue was the mounting scientific consensus outside of Hansen, such as in 2007 with the *Fourth Assessment Report* by the United Nation's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that declared the scientific evidence for man-made global warming was "unequivocal" (Hertsgaard, 2011, p.8). While there are many uncertainties in climate science, including the severity, timing and price location of effects, 98 percent of scientists around the world are certain that climate change is happening and human caused (Gore, 2011; Hertsgaard, 2011). Furthermore, it has been said that climate change is one of the most important and challenging issues of our time (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2004). For we must fundamentally alter our globalized state built on cheap energy in order to solve this

crises, otherwise we risk surpassing a tipping point, where the Earth's feedback mechanism will produce what is called "runway climate change" and the next mass extinction will be human induced (Hertsgaard, 2011). It's complicated by the fact that climate change is more than a single-issue and rather an umbrella of issues that is rooted to almost all sectors and problematic conditions in our collective society - from economics, industry, politics to human rights, globalization, environment, and so on. Thus, being one of the most significant challenges humans have faced, environmentalists had begun campaigns around global warming since the third wave (Shabecoff, 2003), but it wasn't until the mid-millennia in the fourth wave with heightened public awareness that the climate movement had become championed (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2011), taking the lead of the environmental movement.

The Green Fad

With a climate awakening in the public, the movement had become mainstream again, but even more popular than was experienced in the previous waves. Green was not only accepted, but it was *in vogue,* and there was a burst of "green fad" in western societies. Environmental news, especially climate news, was in every newspaper from the *New York Times* to *Time* Magazine, while seemingly every magazine, including *Sports Illustrated*, had a special green issue (Hunter, 2009; Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2011). Oprah Winfrey backed Al Gore on her show in 2006, a show that was not only the highest-rating daytime talk show in history but a show that appealed to middle America (Illig, 2008). The first Live Earth concert was in 2007, raising awareness on climate change with 150 musical acts including Madonna, held in eleven major cities, broadcast to 130 countries with tens of millions of viewers (Live Earth, 2007). Eco-Warriors hit the big screen with celebrity turned environmentalist Leonardo Dicaprio hosting the film *The 11th Hour* (2007) and James Cameron's blockbuster hits *Avatar* (2009) (Hunter, 2009a). Mainstream environmental groups ballooned in size, with Greenpeace and WWF memberships in the millions, employing thousands of staff and spending hundreds of millions on campaigns (Secrett, 2011). Meanwhile, green consumerism was on the rise, purchasing trendy reusable bags to CFC light bulbs, as well as, sustainable fashion was all the rage at the London and New York Fashion weeks (Hunter, 2009).

For a time, it seemed the most of the public had accepted the realities of climate change and many sectors were joining the parade, including the corporate sector that had usually detested environmentalists (Illig, 2008). Businesses attuned to the trends sold a plethora of green products, from biodegradable cleaning products to hybrid cars, even Fortune 500 companies pledged to go carbon neutral (Gore, 2011; Illig, 2008). Some could argue, of course, this was merely "greenwashing," a type of whitewashing where companies disingenuously spin their products and policies as environmentally friendly (Hunter, 2009b), however, many perceived it as a step in the right direction (Gore, 2011). Governments too were stepping in line with a greening of politics, as the United States Congress restarted a dormant effort for climate legislation (a.k.a. the Waxman-Markey bill) in spring of 2008 (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2011) and a climate politician, Stéphane Dion, led the Liberal Party of Canada from 2006 – 2008 who supported a carbon tax (Hunter, 2009a). Meanwhile, internationally, a global climate treaty looked within reach, after the Bali climate summit in 2007 renewed the call for a successor of the Kyoto Protocol (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2011). It can be said that at this time the movement was becoming broader, including sectors of society that had usually been excluded. It was no longer just for the leftist or progressive minded, but becoming a bipartisan movement that appealed to the mass public, business and politicians, as well as to the young (Illig, 2008). Perhaps one of the most inspiring signals of a revitalization of environmentalism was in the youth climate movement, something that was non-existent prior to 2006 (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2011). The youth movement after all was very much the force of the 1960's and 1970's environmental campaigns and its success. The revitalization of youth activism in the fourth wave could be potentially the movement's greatest strength again. The youth climate movement was most evident at Power Shift events, such as in 2007 in Washington when 12,000 youth convened at a conference and protested for the United States government to act (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2011).

However, just as the movement was becoming broader and more inclusive, it was also becoming more global as well. With climate change being a global issue, no one country or people can escape it, and thus there naturally needed to be a global response, not just in terms of a global treaty but a global movement. While certainly international environmentalism existed as far back as the 1970's with the founding of Friends of the Earth International, as well as, the grassroots

global sprouting in the 3rd wave (Shabecoff, 2003), it was not until the fourth wave that a truly transnational environmental movement emerged on a mainstream level. After 2006, the trend for many activists and groups were to construct alliances across countries, boundaries and divides, such as with the Climate Action Networks and Rising Tide networks. Perhaps to best testify to the global reach of the movement is with the birth of the Chinese environmental movement. China being the largest contributor to climate change, next to the United States, was increasingly facing the negative impacts of its rapid development with air and water pollution (Xie, 2011). In response to these problems and increased global environmental involvement by the state in recent years, as well as, allowances for citizen engagement in these issues, though still limited, a "vivid environmental activism has emerged among the Chinese," according to Lei Xie in *China's Environmental Activism in the Age of Globalization* (2011, p. 208). Since 1995, environmental demonstrations have risen by more than 25% each year to reach 128,000 (Xie, 2011). As well, by October 2008, over 3,500 environmental groups existed, not including Internet-based groups, many funded and supported by the international non-governmental organizations (INGO's) (Xie, 2011).

There was of course something unique about this time that facilitated this global, alliance-based, broader climate movement to exist -– the Internet. The Internet became a very powerful new tool for activism in the early 21st century. Deanna A. Rohlinger and Jordan Brown argue in *Democracy, Action and the Internet After 9/11* (2009) that the Internet provides a free space, not entirely monopolized by corporations or government, that allow oppositional voices to be shared and can encourage participants to move from cyberspace to real world activism. The fourth wavers of the environmental movement have done just that, using the Internet as a tool for real-world mobilization. Groups such as 350.org and Earth Hour have galvanized historic numbers of participants using online social networking and interactive websites that allowed individuals to join global days of action (Hunter, 2011). For 350.org, they organized what CNN called "the most widespread day of political action in the planet's history," by coordinating 5,200 climate demonstrations in more than 180 countries on October, 24, 2009, using the advances of the Internet (Hunter, 2011). As well, Earth Hour synchronizes an annual hour of climate awareness with thee Internet as well, for example the year 2010 reached more than 4,600 cities, town and

municipalities in 128 countries with 1.3 billion participants – over one-sixth the Earth's population (Hunter, 2011).

Reform Environmentalism & Green Capitalism

Despite the unity building in the movement, divisions occurred as they have always in previous waves. According to several interviewed for this paper, there are two major camps in the climate movement that are at odds with one another. One is the mainstream climate movement, otherwise known as "reform environmentalists," which supports inside-the-box change by working within the existing power structures (Dawson, Personal Interview, June 29, 2011). The second is the climate justice movement, which supports outside-the-box change by working towards alternative power dynamics (Dawson, Personal Interview, June 29, 2011; DeChristopher, Personal Interview, July 1, 2011). First, we will examine reform environmentalism with a discussion on recent historical events that have affected the movement. Subsequently, a discussion of the climate justice movement will follow. However, it must be noted that not every reform environmentalist and climate justice activist will agree with the following description. There is of course debate in each camp and individuals who reside somewhere in the middle of these two camps. These are of course general discussions of each that have been synthesized from countless research articles and numerous interviews.

To begin, reform environmentalists core theoretical tenant exists in system theory, the idea that for better or for worse, the current state of the world exists where the economy and the environment are interdependent of each other, therefore to address environmental problems like that of climate change it must be accomplished through the parameters of existing economic and system order (Levy, 2010). Hence, reformists generally place faith in technological, market-based and legislative solutions to solve the climate crisis, as well as, support individual lifestyle changes to alter consumer trends (Levy, 201; Schlemback, 2011). For example, in 2007 Al Gore, a poster boy for reformist environmentalism, became business partners with Kleiner Perkins, one of the oldest and most successful venture capital funds in the United States, funding the start of such companies as Amazon and Google (Illig, 2008). The partnership with Gore was built on enterprising new green technological innovation, as they believed that greentech could be the

"largest economic opportunity of the 21st century" (Illig, 2008, p.233). This would be through solar, wind, and hydro renewable energy development, as well as, new innovation such as with enhanced geothermal and biomass energy (Gore, 2011). Gore asserts that these renewable energies could soon produce power competitive with the cheap and dirty fossil fuels (Gore, 2011).

These were not just market and technological solutions to climate change, but as Van Jones wrote in his book *The Green Collar Economy* (2008) it would be fixing another prolific crisis as well, that of poverty. Perhaps the reincarnation of the sustainable development model from the Rio Summit in 1992, what was dubbed the "green economy" model prescribed investment in renewable energies as a measure for reducing fossil fuels dependency while providing a plethora of new jobs to people, such as in retrofitting old buildings, installing solar panels and revitalizing the inner city – it would support both economic and environmental wellbeing (Jones, 2008). This was something that politicians could sink their teeth into during the beginning of the 2008 economic crash, appealing both to the need for economic alternatives and to the environmental popularity at the time. By the 2008 United States presidential election the green economy model was supported by both the Democratic candidate and Republic candidate (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2011). Following, the election of Barack Obama as the 44th president saw a period of unprecedented hope by the public believing the president to be a leader of change, for reformists the legislative change they believed could solve the underlying climate crisis. Because of this, many reformists put much of their weight behind Obama's legislative plans for green economy model, climate legislation with domestic cap and trade, as well as with an international binding climate treaty to be negotiated later in the year at Copenhagen (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2011).

However, not everything came to pass as the hope bubble burst, especially in the reformist camp. First, the investments in renewable energies during the height of the green fad did not produce the wealth of jobs and capital as promised, at least thus far. Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2011) argue the only jobs to come out of greentech in recent years have been short-term and temporary, while investment is currently under threat as stimulus funds expire and subsides could retreat with the economic collapse. As the greentech industries dry up, they argue the reformists have

both discredited and polarized the clean energy industry in their campaigning for the green economy, as the model did not materialize promises to the public and the industry became synonymous with what was becoming a polarizing climate debate (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2011). Meanwhile, the cap and trade bill for the United States, otherwise known as the American Clean Energy and Security Act (what was formerly known as the Waxman-Markey bill), was also a failure. Although it passed in the House it was nearing an end in April 2009 and finally killed in the Senate by 2010 (Herszenhorn & Hulse, 2010; Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2011). Reformists placing all their eggs in one basket lost everything they had been lobbying for. After twenty years there would, once more, be only congressional inaction on the climate crisis in one of the most powerful nation, the United States, something that came to echoed elsewhere, such as in Canada (Dawson, 2010; Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2011). However, in an interview with Ashley Dawson, an associate professor from City University of New York, the death of the cap and trade bill was perhaps for the better (Personal Interview, June 29, 2011). For the bill would not only fail to reduce emissions significantly, a mere 4 to 5 percent fewer emissions by 2020, but establishing a carbon market, as cap and trade does, would be the formation of what critics call "green capitalism" - the next evolution of neoliberalism tyranny (Dawson, 2010; Personal Interview, June 29, 2011).

According to Dawson, despite the name, "green capitalism does not seek to and will not solve the underlying ecological contradictions of capital's insatiable appetite for ceaselessly expanding accumulation of a finite environmental base. Instead, green capitalism seeks to profit from the current crisis," such as the environmental and financial crises and therefore continue the ravages of our economic and political juggernauts (2010, p.314). Perhaps the disaster capitalism complex at its finest, the green capitalism new order was emerging clearly with the formation of the cap and trade bill (Dawson, 2010). Cap and trade, that of limiting the amount of carbon by polluters with the ability for trading in carbon permits, may sounds like an effective plan in reformist environmentalism for coping with the climate crisis, however critics argue it "essentially commodifies the atmosphere" (Dawson, Personal Interview, June 29, 2011). Through carbon trading, companies could stand to make more than $10 trillion each year for doing nothing more than relocating environmental and social ills elsewhere, says Dawson (2010). The problem with cap and trade, critics argue, is that its not just limiting emissions but in trading emissions this

scheme allows corporations to continue their unsustainable behavior by simply paying off other companies, usually in the Global South that pollutes less, to absorb the emissions for them (2010). One example of this is REDD, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, which on paper encourages corporations to buy up land and forests, again usually in the Global South, to be preserved against deforestation and for the promotion of "carbon sinks " (Turner, 2010). In practice, this usually results in vast monoculture plantations, such as palm oil plantations that only stems deforestation, exiles Indigenous communities from their homelands or displaces huge numbers of subsistence farmers, and further provides access for "leakages" with roads and logging – all contributing to emissions and abuses to human rights (Dawson, 2010; Turner, 2010). This is what some governments and social movements from the Global South call "carbon colonialism" (Turner, 2010), heightening economic and political inequalities but masked as environmentalism. The rhetorical manipulation of painting destructive policies as "green" was the beginning of dangerous times ahead.

The Copenhagen Summit

Despite cap and trade dying in the United States, green capitalism would continue to emerge but this time at the United Nations level. The United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP15) held in Copenhagen in December of 2009 was pitted by reformist greens as "the best and last chance" to solve our global dilemma (Hunter, 2009c; Hunter, 2011). Like the Rio Summit, it was a historic moment where for a time it seemed the stars had aligned for meaningful social change. Nearly all the world leaders were in attendance set to negotiate, and it seemed for a time likely to agree, on an internationally binding climate treaty to reduce global greenhouse emissions, the successor of the Kyoto Protocol (Hunter, 2009c). Engagement and activism by the public was at an all time peak for climate summits with over 30,000 civil society participants from various organizations around the world registered to attend the summit, many more activists outside the summit protesting as expressed in the 60,000 to 100,000 person march mid-summit (Fisher, 2010; Hunter, 2009c). As well, it seemed the world was watching; there was an internationally coordinated Global Day of Action in 108 countries during negotiations and the climate summit dominated international media (Fisher, 2010; Hunter, 2009c). Perhaps what was most significant at Copenhagen was not the greater scale and international attention

paid to the summit compared to past summits, but that the President of the United States was leading the march instead of snubbing multilateral environmental negotiations (Hunter, 2009c).

President Obama initially appeared to be a climate savior by many reformists. In his first year in office in the United States, he had included climate-friendly initiatives into his economic stimulus package that of the green economy model with doubling renewable energy production in the next three years (Gore, 2011). He improved fuel efficiency standards for automobiles and he instructed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to move forward with regulating emissions under the Clean Air Act (Gore, 2011). However, for some including Al Gore, Copenhagen changed the tune of Obama's climate leadership. Gore blames Obama's failure to ensure the passage of domestic climate legislation with cap and trade as setting the stage for Copenhagen to crumble (Gore, 2011). Yet some argue that there were others at play, including the Danish government (Hunter, 2011; Powless, 2010). Within the first few days a leaked document had surfaced called the "Danish Text," a draft climate proposal written and shared between the Group of Eight nations that proved elitism was emerging in the United Nations multilateral process, or that of carbon colonialism (Hunter, 2011; Powless, 2010). With these exposed back-roomed dealings and inequalities, many were outraged including the Group of Seventy-Seven leader, Lumumba Stanislaus Di-Aping, who represented more than a hundred developing nations and who walked out of the conference in the first week in response to the Danish Text, temporarily shutting down the negotiations (Hunter, 2009c). As well, Dana R. Fisher argues civil society too was sidelined as registered participants were shut out of the negotiations and literally left out in the cold (Fisher, 2010). Part poor planning by the Danish government and part heightened security nearing the end of the summit with world leaders in attendance, by the second week a mere 7,000 out of 30,000 civil society participants were allowed inside the summit, while this was further reduced to 1,000 on the final Thursday and 90 on the last day of the summit, stripping civil society of its ability to influence the negotiations (Fisher, 2010).

At the end of the summit, a closed-door meeting occurred with the biggest polluters: the United States, China, India, Brazil and South Africa – what became known as the BASIC Group - to negotiate a climate deal as the multilateral process fell apart (Hunter, 2011; Powless, 2010). For

many, this was the Danish Text realized as elitism took over, excluding the most vulnerable nations, most impacted by climate change that of the Global South and shutting out civil society organizations (Hunter, 2009c). However, what was of a greater danger was the concluding document from the BASIC Group, the Copenhagen Accord, a noncommittal proposal that circumnavigated multilateralism and was the manifesto for global green capitalism, as it supported carbon markets and REDD (Bond, 2010; Turner, 2010). Some might argue that there were some benefits of the Accord, such as its recognition of the scientific view that global temperatures should not rise past 2 degrees Celsius. However, critics state that the 2 degrees limit will support life on the Global North, but it will virtually wipe out small island states and coastal areas predominately in the Global South (Bond, 2010). Either way, after Copenhagen the green capitalism agenda was being put forward on a transnational level with unknown damage still ahead.

The Emerging Climate Justice Movement

While the Copenhagen climate summit crumbled, a new movement was emerging called the climate justice movement. On one of the final days of the Copenhagen summit, on December 16, 2009, a protest took place called "Reclaim Power" with the intention to "take over the conference for one day and transform it into a People's Assembly" in order to mobilize against the climate elitism and green capitalism outgrowth of the summit (Hunter, 2009c; Fisher, 2010). Some estimate around 3,000 to 4,000 activists had joined the protest, while only reaching the heavily militarized bridge in front of the conference center they had reclaimed some space to hold a People's Assembly, that of an alternative discussion where the commons negotiate their own climate proposal (Hunter, 2009c). It was considered a significant feat as the moment marked the emergence of the global climate justice movement (Dawson, Personal Interview, June 29, 2011; DeChristopher, Personal Interview, July 1, 2011; Fisher, 2010). For as one activist yelled out in the middle of the protest: "this is the dawning of a new movement" (Hunter, 2009c; 2011).

This new movement, the climate justice (CJ) movement, was perhaps not so new as its roots stem from the environmental justice movement that began in the third wave, that intersection of social justice and environmental concerns. While Copenhagen gave the space for the global CJ

movement to emerge, grassroots CJ movements did exist prior in the local, regional and national levels in the United States and elsewhere during the early to mid-millennia, attempting to reframe climate change as a human rights issue (Dawson, 2010). This need for a rethinking of the climate crisis was first set forth after a 1999 report was released called *Greenhouse Gangsters vs. Climate Justice* by the San Francisco based NGO Corporation Watch where the link between oil exploration and human rights violations around the world was made abundantly clear (Brotsky, Bruno & Karliner, 1999; Dawson, 2010). For example the report included the story of Ogoni activist and writer Ken Saro-Wiwa who in 1995 was executed for his work opposing environmental and social atrocities by Shell and the Nigerian military junta (Brotsky, Bruno & Karliner, 1999; Dawson, 2010). Furthermore, the CorpWatch report did not just end at reframing global warming but also projected a novel vision at the time of greater scale of the CJ resistance – that of a transnational CJ movement that could resist transnational capitalism (Brotsky, Bruno & Karliner, 1999; Dawson, 2010). This transnational CJ movement would slowly but surely come to live after the CorpWatch report and at the Copenhagen summit.

However, this emerging movement was not just the "intersection of red and green issues, but often had a black (anarchistic) tint" (Schlemback, 2011, p. 196), as its roots also lie in alter-globalization and anti-capitalist activism (Best, 2006). For the CJ movement, the climate crisis had a deeper cause than problems with excessive carbon in the atmosphere; rather the climate crisis was the symptom to the systematic failures of capitalism (Best, 2006; Dawson, 2010). According to Ashley Dawson in *Climate Justice: The Emerging Movement against Green Capitalism* (2010), the crises experienced over the last couple of years with that of the financial crash, gyrating energy prices and the climate crisis are not separate events but interwoven effects of the same cause: "the planet consuming rapacity of a capitalist system that must grow incessantly or expire" (p. 314). The capitalist system after all lives through an infinite growth model based on accumulation, consumption and resources, that in practice benefits a few, meanwhile existing in a finite resource world (Best, 2006). As a result it has constructed a political and financial elitism that intensify systematic contradictions of natural destruction and human suffering (Dawson, 2010). Therefore, climate justice activists believe social and environmental perils cannot be dealt without attempting to alter the capitalistic root of the problem.

However, beyond its capitalist critique, the global CJ movement also grew out of a response to the failing of the reformist greens, like the Earth First! before it grew out of a response to the mainstream in the 3rd wave. Reformist greens had after all supported green capitalism with cap and trade legislation and carbon marketing initiatives of REDD, such as Greenpeace and the Environmental Defense Fund (although some do demand amendments to REDD) (Bond, 2010; Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2011). As well, in an interview with Dawson, he asserts that the entire green economy model that Van Jones and other reformists supported "is still a form of green capitalism because it does not articulate the need to transform the economy and social relations" (Personal Interview, June 29, 2011). Moreover, the CJ movement was responding to the failures of reformists to alter social dynamics. As was pointed out by Shabecoff and Dawson, for decades the mainstream movement has "failed to incorporate the perspective of communities most affected by the toxic by-product of unregulated growth" as it was not counted as "environmental" (Dawson, 2010, p. 316; Shabecoff, 2003). This time was no different, as climate justice remained peripheral to the agenda of mainstream groups, although not all mainstream environmental organizations (Dawson, 2010). However, what was different was a type of double jeopardy for the impacted communities, it was not just the pollution of their waters, land and air any longer, they were also usually the first to be impacted by a heating world. For example, as Dawson notes, in New York neighborhoods where there are predominantly ethnic minorities, there are disproportionate share of the city's polluting facilities, such as incinerators, diesel bus shelters, and sewage, while there is also a disproportionate share of asthma compared to the city with roughly one-quarter of children in Harlem suffering from the disease (Dawson, 2010). Furthermore, it is usually these communities who are hit hardest by the ever-sweltering summers, as they usually lack the economic means to acquire air conditioning units. These kinds of disparities, what some would call again carbon-colonialism, reflects a need for greater climate justice resistance in both mainstream and grassroots levels, as a movement that transcends the boundary of what usually gets counted as "environmental," including inner-city issues and social inequalities (Dawson, 2010; Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2004).

In crossing divides and boundaries, the climate justice movement overall has created far more alliances and has become far more broader in scope of its issues than the mainstream reformists. The CJ movement has included union workers, blue-collar workers, African Americans, Hispanic, Indigenous communities, minorities, animal rights, anarchists, feminists and so on (Best, 2006; Dawson, 2010). As Dawson writes: "the movement was not just about environment issues, but rather that social justice goals such as economic equity, cultural liberation, and the political participation of people of color at all levels of decision making were an integral part of the struggle" (2010, p. 326) – nothing short of a revolution. While never a singular group, but rather a transnational coalition of groups that "organized as a multi-issue, multi-racial alliance that can mount effective opposition to capitalism" (Best, 2006, p.8). Growing out of the failures of the mainstream reformists, the "climate justice movement has emerged out of the shadows of the mainstream environmental movement" and beginning to be recognized as its own movement, according to an interview with Tim DeChristopher, a renowned climate justice activist (Personal Interview, July 1, 2011). In striking contrast to reformists, the CJ activists believe that no meaningful change can occur using the same technological, economic, and governmental tools that created the problems in the first place (Hunter, 2009c). Rather the use of grassroots organizing from the bottom-up, direct action, in most cases illegal, and alliance building are preferred to resist green capitalism and radicalize our power dynamics towards an egalitarian, participatory democracy that does not compromise social human rights and environmental sustainability (Best, 2006; Dawson, 2010; DeChristopher, Personal Interview, July 1, 2011). Perhaps a utopian narrative, but as Dawson argues, progressive movements need a comprehensive positive vision to realize their goals (2010, p. 332).

Criticism of Climate Justice

Nevertheless, every utopian vision has its cracks. With such numerous groups, agendas and egos under the same umbrella of climate justice, participant-observers note the movement is no doubt internally contentious (Hunter, 2009c; Schlemback, 2011). As a study of the Camps for Climate Action in the UK by Raphael Schlemback (2011) shows there are numerous areas of tension and concern within climate justice realms that environmental, social justice or even anarchistic principals are not being met. The Camp for Climate Action was a series of high-

profile protests, as well as, gatherings in the UK, which took place from 2006 to 2009 (Schlemback, 2011). One of the first major events that highlighted climate justice's internal struggles within the Camp was in 2008 when organizers looked to discredit the plans of Kingsnorth coal plant to become a "clean coal" tech company with carbon capture and store (CCS) technology, an unproven technology that literally sweeps carbon into the earth as a form of solution to the climate crisis (Hunter, 2009d; Schlemback, 2011). However, a former National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) official, Dave Douglas, took issue with this as he perceived the Camp's campaign as "middle class environmental agenda that neglected organized labour" (Schlemback, 2011, p. 202). Perceived as classist and job-killing, a debate stirred inside the Camp and continued past the 2008 gathering until trade unionists and campers met at a conference to resolve their tensions (Schlemback, 2011). In the end no resolution occurred, climate activists stayed unmoved in their opposition to coal mining and "clean coal" rhetoric, even in supporting a "just transition" for workers this principal did not alter campaigning in any significant way and as a result mine workers never participated in their protests (Schlemback, 2011).

Another area of concern is whether climate justice is loosing sight of its environmental principals. For as Tim DeChristopher says in an interview: "climate justice movement has more in common with social justice movement than it does with the environmental movement" (Personal Interview, July 1, 2011). While the environmental justice movement in the third wave and the CJ movement of today have proved that the social and environmental crises are inseparable, the question still looms: could one agenda take precedent over another? For as Schlemback states, "in practice, the Camp has not found it easy staying true to both its green and social agenda" (2011, p. 212). Lastly, as the Camp hosted in its later years some influential voices that advocated government-led solutions, anarchists felt that the gatherings risked loosing sight of its anti-capitalist, anti-authoritarian roots, instead "appearing as a gathering that lends its support to top-down, state centered responses to the climate crisis" (Schlemback, 2011, p. 210) – essentially becoming its nemesis, reformist environmentalism.

Some of those influential voices that the Camp hosted and the anarchists resented included George Monbiot, a famous British climate advocate and columnist for *The Guardian* (UK)

(Schlemback, 2011). Monbiot later criticized the Camps and the climate justice movement in his writings of "diverting from the urgent task" of stopping climate change (Schlemback, 2011, p.210). He argued, what some consider the pragmatic argument over the climate crisis, that while social and political considerations were commendable they were unrealistic considering the timeline of the situation with some predicating a tipping point being reached within the next few decades (Monbiot, 2008). Reformist environmentalism, according to Monbiot and many others, is the only course of action for social change in the 11th hour predicament we find ourselves in. Furthermore, he claimed the type of alternative new world order the CJ movement advocated for was environmental rhetoric for a path towards a "quasi-Hobbesian state of nature," a return to our hunter-gathering days that was not only impossible but merely a delusional fantasy, and once again useless in the fight against climate change (Monbiot, 2008, p. 2). Moreover, other critics such as Dana R. Fisher argue in *COP-15 in Copenhagen* (2010) that the merging of movements is one of the factors that leads to the disenfranchisement of civil society and diverts from constructing social change on our global dilemma. Such as with the climate justice demonstration of Reclaim Power that merged inside the summit groups with outside the summit groups together in one united protest (Fisher, 2010; Hunter, 2009c). Fisher claims this contributed to the decision for the summit organizers to limit access to NGO delegations, such as those with activists participating in Reclaim Power (Fisher, 2010). Citing security concerns with their involvement in the protest, numerous organizations that had been previously registered to take part inside the negotiations were left out in the cold in the final week including Friends of the Earth International, Avaaz and TckTckTck, contributing to their inability to participate and influence decision making (Fisher, 2010). "Ironically, the more civil society actors try to participate and the diversity of the perspectives represented by civil society actors involved – the less access they are likely to have," states Fisher (Fisher, 2010, p. 16).

The Crash

While the case can be made that the fourth wave environmentalism continues today, it has certainly begun to see the trends of an end over the last two years with a series of events that has set the climate movement back half a decade if not longer. It had begun weeks before the Copenhagen collapse with what was dubbed "Climate Gate," a media and blogging sensation

that grew exponentially gaining new footing in the debate over climate skepticism (Sarewitz, 2010). Through a series of hacked emails from the University of East Anglia's Climate Research Unit (CRU) in Norwich, UK, critics argued that the emails showcased scientists manipulating climate data and suppressing the critics (Hickman & Randerson, 2009). Later a report that investigated the matter cited that while the CRU scientists behaved poorly and showed a lack of transparency, there was no evidence of fraud or scientific misconduct (Gillis, 2010). However, this had little bearing on the assault that was taking place on climate science. For after one scandal there was another with the mainstream media and online bloggers fanning the flames. This time it was the discovery of errors in the 2007 report by the IPCC that stated the Himalayan glaciers could be melted by 2035 – an admission found to be false by the *New Scientist* in January 2010 (Pearce). Since then, public confusion over the climate crisis has heightened to new degrees (Gore, 2011), no longer is the mainstream public and media accepting of climate science sending the movement back pre-2006. Probably most damaging is the diminished credit climate scientists have with the public, with critics accusing them of falsifying or exaggerating evidence in order to win more research grants or pursue hidden political agendas (Gore, 2011).

Furthermore, if climate elitism and green capitalism began to surface on the global scale at Copenhagen, they were realized at the next UN climate summit held in Cancun a year later. The negotiations were held in an exclusive resort, the Moon Palace, with great distance kept from civil society (Higgins, 2010; Hunter, 2010). The mainstream NGO's were housed 7 kilometers away in a temporary facility called Cancunmesse, meanwhile peasants movements or food justice movements, such as *La Via Campesina,* were kept at bay 22 kilometers away in an inner-city stadium (Higgins, 2010; Hunter, 2010). While expectations were low for Cancun considering the great Copenhagen debacle, when agreements were made at the end of the summit reform environmentalists and mainstream journalists declared it a "significant step forward" in maintaining the multilateral process in solving climate change (Broder, 2010). However, the only step forward many critics argue was towards adopting principals of the elite Copenhagen Accord into the multilateral process – essentially making a draft document with no UN status as legitimate (Bond, 2010). Some of the key components that resulted in the Cancun Agreement include non-binding targets, therefore, voluntary emission reductions (Shopley, 2010). Specialists agree that even if current commitments are met on this pledge and review system, the

targets are insufficient resulting in a 3.2 degree Celsius rise in global temperatures, according to Climate Action Tracker, and up to 4 – 5 degrees by others (Bond, 2010; Shopley, 2010) – far beyond scientific demands of 2 degrees. Furthermore, what gained most traction at the summit was the adoption of REDD+ into the Cancun Agreement, what some say will halt forest loss with added amendments, others criticize as legitimizing global green capitalism (Bond, 2010; Dawson, Personal Interview, June 29, 2011).

Another sign of derailment at Cancun was the loss of civil society engagement. Perhaps expected, the turnout of NGO's and activists was greatly diminished than in the year prior, reflecting possibly a loss of activism post-Copenhagen (Hunter, 2010). However, what was surprising was that those who took the lead in mobilizing the public were neither the reformists nor the climate justice movement, but rather the lead was taken from the food justice movement with *La Via Campesina* (DeChristopher, Personal Interview, July 1, 2011; Hunter, 2010). During the Cancun summit, *La Via Campesina*, otherwise known as the peasant's movements, lead an international caravan of peasants, farmers and Indigenous Peoples from the Global South, as well as journalists, activists and farmers from the Global North to witness and document the climate suffering of Mexicans (Hunter, 2010). Also, on one of the final days of the summit, on December 7, 2010, the group organized the largest march in Cancun, the Indigenous and Social Peasant March, mobilizing 4,000 *campesinos* (allies) in Cancun that temporarily shut down the main highway to the airport and reached its end with a heavily armed military enclosure closing off the road 7 kilometers away from the Moon Palace negotiating space (Higgins, 2010; Hunter, 2010). Despite the obvious oppression of dissent in Cancun, solidarity demonstrations took place alongside *La Via Campesina's* efforts of an International Day of Action in 37 countries (La Via Campesina, 2010). However, these are far fewer countries and numbers of participants engaged than during the height of the Copenhagen summit.

What is most disturbing in recent years is not the lowered civil engagement, the advancement of green capitalism and carbon colonialism, nor the loss of public legitimacy over climate science, but that the world as we know it is running out of time, as Dr. James Hansen asserted in his 2008 testimony before Congress (Hansen, 2008). Many scientists debate the length of time humans have until we reach a tipping point, however, most agree that it is within reach. Some contest that

we have 10 years to stabilize the Earth's climate (Lenton *et al*, 2008), others say we have till December 2016 (Johnson & Simms, 2008), while Dr. Hansen asserts that we have already crossed the threshold point, as the Earth is well past the safe upper limit of 350 ppm (Hansen *et al*, 2008). Whatever the length of time, we are already in a state of an unstable climatic, for consider the events of the past twelve months: the year 2010 was marked as one of the hottest years on recorded history since measurements were first taken in 1880, with 2011 close to matching it; mega floods displaced twenty million people in Pakistan; historic droughts and fires in Russia killed an estimated 56,000 people and caused food crop failures; some of the deadliest mudslides to hit Brazil killed nearly 900 people; a mass of ice, four times larger than the island of Manhattan, broke off of northern Greenland and melted away; meanwhile, record-breaking tornadoes, floods, droughts and wildfire have ravaged parts of the United States and Canada (Brooks, Karl & O'Lenic, 2011; Gore, 2011). All of this while the fourth wave continues to dwindle instead of being revitalized from these ever-pressing threats. All of this while we continue to dump 90 million tones of greenhouse gas emissions into the Earth's atmosphere every single day, with twenty percent of those emissions staying there 20,000 years from now (Gore, 2011). All the while the science of climate change is even stronger, despite the critics saying otherwise, with a consensus "endorsed by the National Academy of science of every major country in the planet, every major professional scientific society related to the study of global warming and 98 percent of climate scientists throughout the world" (Gore, 2011, p. 2).

So who is to blame for this cataclysmic failure in addressing one of the most important issues of our time? Mark Hertsgaard in *HOT: Living Through the Next Fifty Years on Earth (2011)* asserts that it is the media, for in their attempt for balance they have lost sight of truth and properly informing the public by offering space for both climate science proponents and climate skeptics. Some media have politicized the issue, purposefully confusing the public such as Fox News has done, as expressed with a leaked email by the executive ordering their journalists to "refrain from asserting that the planet has warmed (or cooled) in any given period without immediately pointing out that such theories are based upon data that critics have called into question" (Gore, 2011, p.2). Furthermore, the bipartisanship that existed momentarily with governments and corporations, even if only shallow, soon turned divisive and damaging once again towards the movement. Industry and conservative lobbyists repeatedly frame climate change legislation or

regulation as an attack on jobs, meanwhile corporations spend hundreds of millions of dollars each on misleading advertisements, financing "pseudoscientists" to manufacture doubt and hiring anti-climate lobbyists (Gore, 2011; Shabecoff, Personal Interview, June 30, 2011). Al Gore points his fingers at government, in a Rolling Stone article titled *Climate Denial* (2011), with Obama's failure as a president to lead the public in overcoming this crisis. Gore argues that Obama has not asserted his greatest power as president in persuading the public on the realities of the climate change (2011). His climate leadership has also taken several steps backwards recently with calling for massive expansion of oil drilling in the United States, masked as national security, as well as, not once uttering the words "climate change" in his 2011 State of the Union Speech, a first for any president in the past twenty years including the two Bush presidents (Gore, 2011; Wysham, 2010).

However, others argue that it is not the usual boogeymen that are responsible, that of government, industry or even mainstream media. Rather, as Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2011) assert, it is the environmentalists themselves that bear responsibility in failing to create the movement necessary to solve the crisis, an assertion to be discussed in greater detail in the next section of this research. Either way, the fourth wave environmental movement appears to be coming to an end at the time of writing this paper. Would the fourth wave preserver or would there be a fifth wave emerge? Would environmentalism cease, as the tipping point of runway climate change is reached? Would the task for mitigation of environmental harms be futile and an endless task of adaptation to dangers begin? Or would an entirely new movement be born? This story is left unwritten, however, the following section of this paper offers discussion and analysis into the possible future and evolution of environmentalism.

Part III: An Evolutionary Turning Point

The Death of Environmentalism

Environmentalism has reached a turning point, as some contest that the movement has come to an end and will need to evolve, perhaps into an entirely new formation, if it is to survive. For despite great efforts of the fourth wave, the environmental movement is no closer to addressing one of the most serious environmental crisis humankind has ever faced, that of climate change. That is why Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus have reasserted their 2004 controversial claim over the death of environmentalism in an article entitled *The Long Death of Environmentalism* (2011). However, this new assessment has a major exception that the movement is no longer in a process of dying, but after the fourth wave has died of old age. They argue, that while the world has profoundly changed economically, technologically, politically and most importantly ecologically over the past forty years, environmentalists are using the same strategies and assumption they have used since the 1970's (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2011). This lack of adaptation to the changed landscape has made the environmental movement outdated and obsolete.

However, their assertion has roused a spirited debate amongst environmental leaders, journalists and academics over the last half decade, some agreeing with Shellenberger and Nordhaus in principal, calling for reforms and a rebirth of the movement, perhaps changing a turning point into an evolutionary turning point (Guana, 2008; Ryann, 2011; Secrett, 2011; Wapner, 2010). What that rebirth might look like is just as contested as the death debate itself (Guana, 2008), nevertheless, this paper offers its own analysis into the rebirth discussion subsequently. Others argue that Shellenberger and Nordhaus's claim is overly simplified and misrepresents the movement, basing their conclusions on solely twenty-five interviews, mainly individuals from the mainstream environmental organizations and omitting the perspective of environmental justice and climate justice movements (Gelobter *et al*, 2005; Pope, 2005). Therefore, this potential death could only transpire in the mainstream organizations, otherwise known as the conventional environmental movement, and the following criticism presented in this section is only suitable for this part of the movement; discussion of a death elsewhere, such as in the

radical contingents and in environmental justice, are not analyzed within this paper. Furthermore, critics also argue the scale of the crisis has not been appropriately compared in their report to previous contexts, with climate change requiring an unprecedented economic transformation that make this particular issue unlike anything the movement has seen prior, resulting in disappointing progress (Pope, 2005). Either way, it is the assertion of this paper that a death of conventional environmentalism has occurred and thus, further analysis into the "death" is provided, to some extent based from the criticism of Shellenberger and Nordhaus and to a larger extend, alternative critiques offered by others.

To begin, Shellenberger and Nordhaus's original report entitled *The Death of Environmentalism* (2004) concedes its conclusions of a "death" of the movement based on failings, they argue, by environmentalists, as stated, failings of environmentalists from the mainstream environmental organizations. They argue that environmentalism has become a special interest with social change limited to narrow solutions in policy technicalities. Policy battles have won the environmental movement numerous victories in the past, including the passage of series of environmental laws in the 1970's, including the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Air and Water Acts, as well as the 1990's Clean Air Act amendment safeguarding against acid rain and the Montreal Protocol with ozone depletion (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2004). However, "the entire landscape in which politics plays out has changed radically" in the last 40 years and policy proposals based on "sound science" will not suffice to overcome the current ideological and industry opposition as it once did (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2004, p. 10), point in case, the consensus of climate change science and failed policy battles with the Kyoto Protocol, cap and trade bill, as well as, the Copenhagen summit. Therefore, with conventional environmentalists unchallenging their assumptions and strategies in ecological politics, whether it is from complacency or arrogance, they have left the movement outdated and ineffective, unable to address the most important ecological crisis yet (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2004). While the mainstream movement itself has been lost, they argue, for in narrowly focusing on policy technicalities, which has deemed environmentalism a special interest, they have failed in developing an inspiring and comprehensive vision leaving the public unengaged and lack of allies with other progressive movements (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2004). Shellenberger and Nordhaus agree another wave of environmentalism existed in recent years, however, it did so

superficially in the public and was short lived, meanwhile further divisions and isolation of the mainstream left conventional environmentalism increasingly obsolete (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2011). Thus, in the mainstream organizations seeking short-term policy solutions rather than long-term political transformation, the movement died.

There are of course other reasons for the death of environmentalism, that of numerous failings of the movement that have disintegrated its integrity and strength over the last couple of decades. Several failings already noted previously within this essay in the overview of the four waves and many too numerous to count documented in political ecology, as well as, critical public and academic discussion (Cronon, 1996; Ryann, 2011; Secrett, 2011). However, for the purposes of this essay we will discuss three major failings, the first of which is the elitist trends of the mainstream environmental organizations. Elitism has existed within the movement since its inception, with land protection and naturalism the hobby of rich, white males (Shabecoff, 2003). Yet despite some efforts by mainstream organizations in the last few decades, typically these organizations are run by the same privileged elites today (Shabecoff, 1990; 2003). This has detrimental impacts to the movement, for as Richard Grossman concedes, former executive director of Greenpeace U.S.A., the white middle-class staff of these top organizations fail to understand the relationship between powerlessness of the poor and the degradation of the environment, drawing lines in the sand between the mainstream environmentalists and many grassroots environmentalists (Shabecoff, 2003). Furthermore, to speak of western hegemony, post-colonialism exists not only in the state level and within private interest, as exemplified with carbon colonialism, but also in the movement itself. Forcing western perception of nature as a "thing" to be protected onto the Global South, such as the World Wildlife Fund who has bought and contained lands in places such as Africa, Asia and Latin America to 'preserve threatened habitats and biodiversity' (Luke, 1997). As of 1997, WWF-US has helped establish, fund or manage nearly 450 parks and reserves worldwide (Luke, 1997). Critics argue this is eco-colonialism, a "green twist" to the same settlement practices of traditional colonialism with economic exploitation and conquering of land, life, and resources for western purposes, drastically altering local economies, cultures and eco-systems (Luke, 1997).

Further to that, another failure has developed, similar to the institutionalizing of the mainstream organizations in the second wave, there is now a corporatizing of these groups that equally threatens the movement. As Christine MacDonald writes in *Green, Inc.* (2008), a significant part of the growth of some of the top environmental organizations has been because of partnerships and donations from the corporate sector. The non-profit sectors, as of 2007, has been seeing growth in revenue, spending and jobs outpace the growth of their local economies, majorly due to their corporate ties according to MacDonald, with many leaders of the top environmental groups seeing some of the greatest benefit from these relationships, "earning annual compensation that puts them in the top 1 percent of Americans" (MacDonald, 2008, p. 19). For example, some of the highest paid U.S. conservation executives earn between $240,000 to $830,000 a year, as of 2006 (MacDonald, 2008). While the corporations stand to benefit from these relationship as well, with status on the boards of many of these organizations, involved in joint marketing partnerships, sponsorship programs and advisory groups allowing many of these private interest to "green" their image, what some would call a type of greenwashing (MacDonald, 2008). The corporations involved with some of these top environmental groups include: Exxon-Mobil infamous for the *Valdez* oil spill; PG&E Corporation, the gas and electric company responsible for the water contamination made famous in the movie *Erin Brockovich*; British Petroleum whose lax regulations and safety standards led to the Gulf oil spill; and American Electric Power, which gets three-quarters of its power from coal-fired plants, a principal driver of climate change (MacDonald, 2008). Perhaps an unethical relationship as MacDonald suggests, however, this might explain the reasoning for the narrow policy focus of these mainstream groups, as discussed by Shellenberger and Nordhaus earlier, and the "deal-making" culture of conventional environmentalism, as they maintain an unthreatening relationship to the hand that feeds them.

However, perhaps more than any other reason for the death of environmentalism is that the public has become "burnt-out." More precisely, through a misguided understanding of human nature, particularly human psychology, the long-term stress of being inundated with environmental crises over the past forty years by environmentalists has made the public exhausted and retracting from pro-environmental behavior (McKinley, 2008). As Andrew McKinley concedes in *Hope in a Hopeless Age* (2008), the shock tactics and pessimistic media

campaigns of the past is a failed strategy to motivate the masses through fear and rather became partly responsible for the figurative construction of what he calls "the hopeless age." This social-psychological phenomenon is the "widely held assumption that the future will be worse than the present and the lives of future generations will be diminished relative to our own" (McKinley, 2008, p. 321). McKinley argues that the building of hopelessness in the public's consciousness has been a counter-productive effort to environmental aims. For example, in a report from the Frameworks Institute that examined the impacts of climate change media campaigns in 2002, they found that the more the public became scared, "the more they wanted to buy SUVs to protect themselves" (McKinley, 2008, p. 323). This reflects basic human psychology, McKinley states, for "when confronted with crisis, uncertainly, and fear - it appears entirely rational for the public to react by taking what action they can to protect themselves in the present rather than fighting larger issues that seem beyond their reach" (2008, p. 323). Resulting in self-absorbed, insular, and defensive behavior (McKinley, 2008), some would argue even leaning towards skeptical behavior.

According to the Pew Research Centre skepticisms is on the rise, for over the course of the time that the film *An Inconvenient Truth* was released and climate education grew, a poll conducted from July 2006 to April 2008 found that the belief that global warming was occurring declined from 79 percent to 71 percent, more recently it has declined further to 57 percent in October 2009 (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2011). Perhaps this is due to the psychological concept of system justification, as Shellenberger and Nordhaus note, the need to maintain a positive view of the existing social order (2011). This is why, and for many other psychological reasons, that the hope narrative rather than hopeless narratives can be more effective. McKinley concludes that "the restoration of a collective vision and message of hope would be far more productive" at constructing the psychological will in the public for mass social change (McKinley, 2008, p. 326). For after all, as Shellenberger and Nordhaus mention, Martin Luther King did not write " I have a nightmare" speech to provide vision and inspiration to the civil rights movement, but "I have a dream" (2004, p. 31). However, the conventional environmental movement is writing a nightmare speech and in its wake has lost the forward momentum of building mass social change with the mainstream public, resulting in its own death.

Towards Post-Environmentalism

Henceforth, with the proclaimed death of conventional environmentalism, the question now becomes: are we heading towards a post-environmental era? By post-environmentalism, this paper asserts an era where environmentalism must metamorphoses into a new formation to survive. Such a change is necessary, according to Shabecoff who states: "If environmentalism is to be an agent of necessary social transformation, it will have to first transform itself" (2003, p. 293). Perhaps that transformation, the evolutionary turning point, starts in challenging the very concept of what we consider to be "environmentalism." According to Shellenberger and Nordhaus, the mainstream organizations have come to conceptualize the environment as a "thing" to be protected, with environmentalists as the defenders of that thing (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2004). However, this objectification of nature results in dangerous fallacies in environmental thinking, according to political ecology critics, for nature becomes an external entity as something "out there" opposed to "inside," such as the concept of wilderness vs. civilization discussed previously in the first wave overview (Cronon, 1996). This allows for a number of problems to occur, such as the intellectual and literal conquering of nature (Cronon, 1996), that of eco-colonialism with WWF park managing in the Global South. Furthermore, the limitations of this conception of nature refrains from ever accepting inner-city issues as environmental, for these issues exist "inside" and not "outside" (Cronon, 1996), perhaps explaining the reluctance of mainstream organizations from addressing environmental justice and climate justice issues.

This is why, as Shellenberger and Nordhaus argue (2004), "a more powerful movement depends on letting go of old identities, categories and assumptions" (p. 7). Specifically challenging what gets counted as "environmental" and what does not (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2004). For if the notion of the environment were to include humans and "inside" places, such as the cities, then the designation of certain problems as environmental and others as not is completely arbitrary (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2004). Thus, by breaking down these walls we begin to head towards what this essay argues is post-environmentalism. This is not to say that in a post-environmental era resisting destruction to our surrounding environments is needless, rather the limits of conventional environmentalism and its conceptions of the environment is needless.

More significantly, post-environmentalism can pave the way for finding common ground with social justice fronts, such as environmental and climate justice movements, as well as, other progressive movements by broadening its scope of environmental issues, as recommended by Shabecoff (2003), as well as, Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004). For if it is understood that political, economic, cultural and value-based contexts generate environmental problems then bridges can be mended towards these other movements - including unions, Indigenous, civil rights, minorities and the poor - realizing that what has been considered opposing movements, environmentalism vs. social justice, are in fact part of the same resistance of the same root causes.

Furthermore, perhaps the entire notion of the "environmental movement" itself is obsolete, as it limits again what activism gets counted as environmental activism and what does not. If we were to move beyond labeling certain movements, struggles and efforts as environmental and others as not, we could recognize that there are many around the world we share common goals with, such as in challenging destruction to surrounding environments. Some examples include: in India where what might be considered environmentalism by the West is in fact a part of a social justice movement concerned with the rights of people to their land and its resources; in Latin America, it is a movement of the poor, with peasants and Indigenous Peoples who are leading campaigns that include land reforms, trade rights and against corporate hegemony; while right-wing ideologues of North America, who are skeptical of climate change, are against sending half a trillion dollars a year abroad for foreign imported oil, while others are against the three million current air pollution deaths a year (Hawken, 2007; Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2011). Therefore, by placing common ground above political conceptions of the environment or the environmental movement, perhaps post-environmentalism can provide space for a greater and more effective movement to exist.

The Rebirth of a Movement

Shellenberger and Nordhaus said in their original report that conventional environmentalism "must die so that something new can live" (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2004, p.10). This type of rebirth in the post-environmental era has largely been discussed in terms of

internal reforms of the mainstream movement. For Shellenberger and Nordhaus, they offer questionable reform recommendations, including expanding development by increasing industrial agriculture and urbanization, appealing to business and advancing technological innovation in order to survive the climate crisis (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2004; 2011) – all of which could very well exacerbate the crisis and maintain detrimental power dynamics. That is why for a rebirth to truly occur it must be the beginning of something new. One recommendation for a rebirth in their report, similar to discussions earlier that this paper supports, is placing environmental issues in broader frames that find common ground with other movements and resistance (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2004). Ironically this is what the Shellenberger and Nordhaus report omitted, while they criticized the mainstream environmental movement of lacking common ground with unions, business and so on, they failed to recognize its common ground with its own "sister movements," that of the environmental and climate justice movements, as well as, other progressive movements, such as Indigenous movements (Gauna, 2008; Gelobter *et al*, 2005). Therefore, to close this gap, we will examine the common grounding of three key movements that could perhaps take the lead of the post-environmentalism era and bring about a rebirth of a new kind of movement to solve the climate crisis.

The first of which is of course is the environmental and climate justice movements, that which was omitted from the Shellenberger and Nordhaus report. *The Soul of Environmentalism* by Michel Gelobter and others (2005) discusses in depth this omission and argues that the environmental justice advocates have been making similar critiques of conventional environmentalism for decades. For the environmental justice movement has questioned mainstream environmentalism with their narrow focus of policy technical fixes, failure to provide a broadened political analysis of environmentalism, as well as, its inability to form alliances with impacted communities (Gelobter *et al*, 2005). Perhaps leading a new type of movements since the 1980's when it began, as the environmental justice movement offers something that conventional environmentalism failed to foster – a transnational, grassroots alliance. For "the environmental justice movement is a very large, decentralized constellation of local organizations, loosely organized communities, and sometimes regional and national networks of affiliate organizations. It is multi-issue, multi-racial, multi-cultural and increasingly multi-national" (Gauna, 2008, p. 470).

Furthermore, this movement encompasses defending diverse ecosystems, from the Amazon rainforest that is the home of Indigenous communities to inner-city poor and minority communities (Gauna, 2008). For environmental justice activists perhaps led the way with post-environmentalism as they redefined the term "environment" in the 1990's as "the place where people live, work, play, learn, and worship" (Gauna, 2008, p.466). However, perhaps to find more common grounding, as Eileen Gauna suggests in *El Dia de Los Muertos: The Death and Rebirth of the Environmental Movement* (2008), that the environmental justice movement will also need to broaden its own term of the "environment." "The environment is more than where we collectively live, work, play, learn and worship. It is also one tiny planet and our only home, a home we share with other sentient being and with future generations" (Gauna, 2008, p. 467). That is why the emergence of the climate justice movement shows the greatest prospects, even though it has its own failings as discussed previously, for it takes environmental justice a step further by understanding the vulnerability of the Earth that provides humanity and social complexes its very existence, while taking up the struggles of social justice. Therefore, perhaps a rebirth does exist with what is to come in the climate justice movement.

Secondly, some look to the food justice movement as the next pioneering force for a new movement, as common grounding is found with food sovereignty and climate change inextricably linked (DeChristopher, Personal Interview, July 1, 2011; Hunter, 2010; Lappé, 2010). According to Anna Lappé in *Diet for a Hot Planet* (2010), industrial agriculture likely accounts for 31 percent or more of human caused greenhouse gases. This claim challenges the IPCC consensus that states agriculture only accounts for 13.5 percent, as Lappé argues "hiding in the IPCC breakdown are the ways in which the food system is connected to climate change within nearly every sector of our economy" (2010, p. 10). If one were to include the emissions of production, processing, distribution, consumption and waste into account of the industrial agriculture industry then "the entire global food chain may account for roughly one third of what's heating our planet" (Lappé, 2010, p. 11). Food justice movements that are taking the lead in connecting their struggles to the issue of climate change include *La Via Campesina*, the force that led the anti-UN climate summit mobilization in Cancun in 2010, organizing the largest

demonstration against carbon colonialism, as discussed previously in the fourth wave (Hunter, 2010).

La Via Campesina presents a strong alternative movement, as it is a coalition of 150 local and national organizations in seventy countries spanning across the Global South in Africa, parts of Asia and Latin America, representing 200 million farmers (La Via Campesina, 2011). However, for most food justice activists, their struggles move beyond climate change, yet their solutions hold potential to resolve both crises. They oppose industrial agriculture run by transnational corporations that ravage their communities, their lands and the climate, while they defend radical economic transformations towards local economies based on small-scale sustainable agriculture, reaffirming their rights to lands and food sovereignty, that could offer an alternative path to the current economic juggernaut (La Via Campesina, 2011). Similar to environmental justice, they decry the mainstream movement for failing to understand common grounding with their movement and build respectful alliances (Hunter, 2010). As well, it too grew organically from the people most disempowered and is potentially a movement more powerful than conventional environmentalism today with grassroots networks stretching the globe (DeChristopher, Personal Interview, July 1, 2011). The food justice movement could be a possible rebirth, for as Tim DeChristopher said in an interview: "the food movement is where the most energy, most momentum and most excitement is happening" (Personal Interview, July 1, 2011).

Lastly, a third avenue is the Indigenous movements. Perhaps not a novel notion as the environmental movement has had an affinity towards the Indigenous movements since the 1960's and probably earlier. Greenpeace's inception, for example, was influenced by a Cree Indigenous prophecy called the *Warriors of the Rainbow*, as the term "eco-warrior" coined by first president Robert Hunter was influenced from this prophecy and a now infamous Greenpeace ship was named the Rainbow Warrior (Hunter, 1979). Indigenous cultures have provided much to environmentalist philosophy, with the Native American concept of Mother Earth that is used by deep ecologists, as well as, others (Gauna, 2008). However, moving towards post-environmentalism and a new movement, common grounding can again be found not just in philosophy, but in similar solutions to similar root causes. For according to the Indigenous Environment Network (IEN), many Indigenous movements challenge western hegemonic and

post-colonial treatments, such as carbon colonialism; attempt to reassert land claims, protecting their water, air, natural resources and health; as well as, respect all living things, people and otherwise (IEN, 2011). Despite diversity in cultural perspectives, geography, history and the environmental issues they face, such unified goals as asserted by the IEN can be proclaimed by varying Indigenous group as they "have managed to come together to execute a fairly unified movement," according to Gauna (2008).

Furthermore, many Indigenous movements are leading the way for a new movement already, as expressed in the Cochabamba conference in April 2010. Following the collapse of the Copenhagen summit, Indigenous Bolivian president Evo Morales announced an alternative conference that provided space for the commons to negotiate their own climate future, it was called the World People's Conference on Climate Change and Rights of Mother Earth (Shultz, 2010; Turner, 2010). All people, social movements and governments were invited to take part in an egalitarian negotiation. However, it was Indigenous communities from Bolivia and around the world who took the lead in the working group discussions (Turner, 2010). While the conference was criticized for failing to challenge dominant power structures and affect social change (Shultz, 2010;), there were successes at the negotiations as well. For example, the Cochabamba moment was attended by 30,000 people from around the world, around the same number as registered participants at Copenhagen, and what resulted from the talks was the Copenhagen Accord (Turner, 2010). The Accord has no status by the UN, yet it does "articulate a sense of hope" to some by establishing the people's framework for a solution to climate change, says Dawson (Dawson, Personal Interview, June 29, 2011). The Accord, also known as the People's Accord, is seen as a manifesto for the commons future with links to the climate justice movement in demanding non-market mechanism, such as the relinquishing of carbon markets and REDD, a recognition of the rights of Indigenous Peoples, as well as a 1 degree Celsius temperature limit rather than 2 degrees, stabilizing the climate for the Global South not just the Global North (Dawson, Personal Interview, June 29, 2011; Turner, 2010).

Beyond A New Movement

However, perhaps we must look beyond singular movements, even the rebirth of new movements, and recognize a greater social phenomenon taking place. In *Blessed Unrest* by Paul Hawken (2007), he began a research endeavor into the scale of civil society engagement, that of the number of non-profit and non-governmental organizations that existed throughout the world. Originally his data estimated that there were a total of 30,000 environmental organizations around the globe, while 100,000 when social justice and Indigenous rights organizations were added into the equation. However, as his research unearthed further data he came to realize that his original conclusions vastly underestimated the magnitude of civil society infrastructures, rather there were over one, even two million organizations in 243 countries, territories, and sovereign islands working towards progressive causes (Hawken, 2007). This, he says, represents a "completely different form of social phenomenon" than previously understood with social movements (Hawken, 2007, p.6). For this is the largest social force in all of human history, he argues, that which environmentalism is only a mere part of. For this phenomenon has three basic roots: environmental activism, social justice initiatives, and indigenous cultures' resistance to globalization, all of which are interconnected, he says. However, the word "movement" to describe this process is limiting, that is why some such as Naomi Klein would call it a "movement of movements," while others such as Gary Snyder call it "the great underground," a current of humanity that is essentially "life that courses under and through and around empires" (Hawken, 2007, p. 12 & 5). Little is known about its scope and functionality; it has eluded the radar of mainstream culture and media to this day (Hawken, 2007). Even individuals a part of it, participants in its root movements, underestimate its scale, basing their judgments on the organizations or networks they encompass (Hawken, 2007). However, what is known of it is that it is an organic, bottom-up driven, self-organized collaboration of tens of millions of people dedicated to progressive social change (Hawken, 2007).

Further to that, Hawken asserts that this no-name movement of movements is based on empathy above all, as it consists of ordinary and extraordinary acts of kindness, caring and compassion for the justice and integrity of others, that of humans, non-humans and our surrounding environments (2007). Empathy is an important driving factor, for as it is written in the *Soul of*

Environmentalism: "empathy is what makes us reach out when we see a wounded bird. It is what calls to us when a child suffers from poverty or asthma. It is how we know our children will miss the snow when the latitudes of climate change have passed us by" (Gelobter *et al*, 2005, p.27). It is in essence our humanity and perhaps this great blooming force in the world that Hawken describes is just that, a great humanitarian response to the crises of our world, a response that propels us to fight against oppression, corruption, exploitation, despair, power and incalculable odds. Furthermore, it could also be a biological response, as Hawken argues (2007). If we were to attempt to explain this social process one can look to a cellular metaphor for how an organism defends itself. For if the collective presence of humanity were seen as an organism, then humanity's immune response would be to resist and heal itself from the effects of political corruption, economic disease, and ecological degradation, says Hawken (2007, p. 12). Perhaps this analogy could explain why coalitions of these movements of movements is pervasive, for no one group or set of organizations can structure or organize this organic and biological response, despite great efforts of some groups and set of organizations, as it would be the most difficult of tasks being that this is the "the most complex association of human beings ever assembled" (Hawken, 2007, p.3). Lastly, the reason that this force has grown exponentially in recent times is because of a response to the advances of the Internet and other communication technologies (Hawken, 2007). For it has never been possible until recently for the entire world to connect, revolutionizing what is possible for many of the groups and individuals involved and re-shifting power dynamics dramatically (Hawken, 2007), point in case, the Arab Spring.

However, then the question must be asked: when might the impact of this rising tide come to fruition to create significant social change globally? According to William Strauss and Neil Howe in *The Fourth Turning* (1997) when Generation Y, or as they call them *Millennials*, matures into their adult age and are faced with a crisis (Howe & William, 2000). Thus, the blossoming of this social force is within a generational response. For they profess their generational theory, which is a cyclical theory of history based on repeating generational archetypes (Howe & William, 1997). There are four archetypes, or as they call them "turnings," and the fourth turning is the "hero" archetype in which they assert is Generation Y (Howe & William, 1997; 2000). Hero archetypes existed in such generations as the G.I. Generation (1901-1924), the adults who lived through the Great Depression and World War II (Howe & William,

1997). The hero generation comes to bloom when they are faced with as crisis, specifically an era of secular upheaval, where old order must be replaced with a new order and were war is waged with apocalyptic finality (Howe & William, 1997). This spark that ignites the generation could be a singular event or a series of events that creates a boiling point, such as the Middle East wars, the financial crash and climate change. Once the majority of Generation Y mature into their adult age, as such enters the workforce and takes ownership of power relations, at that point in recognizing their own crisis they can construct social change and become the Hero archetype. The Hero generation is one that is vigorous and optimistic institution-changers who seek progress, prosperity, and social harmony above all (Howe & William, 1997). To some Generation Y is being ignited already into their Hero archetype, despite the criticism that the Millennials are disengaged and self-absorbed. In an interview with Tara Mahoney, cofounder of the Gen Why Media Project, a project inspired by Strauss and Howe's generational theory, she argues that her generation is already giving resounding recognition to their crisis, does not accept the current economic and political structures and that there is a strong desire for a new world order (Mahoney, Personal Interview, July 20, 2011).

While this generational response has yet to bloom, Generation Y could have something to offer in the meantime to the no-name rising social-phenomenon that Hawken describes, a sense of hope. As Mahoney says: "it is in young people where a sense of optimism exists most in society, that is our greatest strength and it is a revolutionary act that we can engage in as a tool for change" (Mahoney, Personal Interview, July 20, 2011). Hope can be a powerful force, as according to Andrew McKinley's conclusions in *Hope in a Hopeless Age* (2008), a sense of optimism can spawn social change for social movements. Since "optimism is associated with well-being in the wake of adversity and is hence a strong adaptive mechanism" (McKinley, 2008, p.324). Thus, evolving this rising social force to understand basic human psychology, something conventional environmental campaigns have failed to do, is to know that optimism has been linked with positive morale, perseverance, effective problem-solving, success, popularity and longevity – all which are synonymous with effecting long-term change (McKinley, 2008). With a hopeful rather than a hopeless narrative, change is not only necessary to the public, but desirable by offering a better world not a fatalistic one (McKinley, 2008). Yet this hopeful narrative does not need to be naïve for it can be rooted in rational thought, as

MckInley argues, such as in the optimistic knowledge that there is rising support and participation in the movement of movements already and that the necessary resources to help solve crises such as climate change exist, for example, in renewable energies (2008). Optimism was part of the vision that Shellenberger and Nordhaus argued for, as they state: "a positive, transformative vision doesn't just inspire, it also creates the cognitive space for assumptions to be challenged and new ideas to surface" (2004, p. 31). Therefore, in altering the values and vision based on negative correlations with the ills, evils and dilemmas of the world to instead a world of possibility and hope, change is not only feasible but already in motion within the movement of movements itself.

Conclusion

In closing, what has become known as the environmental movement, a catchphrase that represents a social movement transfixed in addressing environmental issues and altering human behavior towards the natural world, has existed over two hundred years with some successes and many failings. Despite great efforts from this movement, we are in many ways still on the same destructive trajectory environmentalists have been fighting to change: old–growth forest continue to be axed, pesticides continue to be used, nuclear weapons continue to threaten us, whales continue to be slaughtered, development continues to be unsustainable for the most part, as well as, climate change continues to advance despite dire scientific predictions of a tipping point and the encroachment of a sixth mass extinction. However, without the environmental movement, as Shabecoff argues, the natural world would be in far worse condition (2003). For the victories may be few, but they are significant, such as the Montreal Protocol banning ozone depleting chemicals globally, water and air pollution legislation in the United States and Canada, the protection of endangered species and vast lands; not to mention the building of a global movement with international organizations and grassroots groups spanning the Global South and Global North, a movement that has survived institutionalization, something few social movements have accomplished; meanwhile affecting almost every sector of society in North America, from science, education, mass communication, industry, government, economics and

so on; and perhaps most importantly, challenging a relationship of dominance that humans have had with the natural world since 10,000 B.C. with the Agricultural Revolution. However, despite existing into the fourth wave, as this paper asserts, a spirited debate has arisen in recent years challenging whether the environmental movement is "running up against its ability to achieve social change" (Shabecoff, 2003, p. 292). Some pronouncing the conventional environmental movement dead as it is "no longer capable of dealing with the world's most serious ecological crisis" – climate change (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2004, p. 6).

Yet whether the conventional environmentalism is viewed as failed, crippled, dead, in the process of a rebirth and transformation into a new kind of movement, or whether it is simply just part of something larger, an unidentified rising social force that could blossom within a generation – there is one imperative that remains mandatory across the board, addressing our climate crisis (Gauna, 2008). Yet it should be recognized that climate change will not be solved by international climate negotiations and state-level responses to the crisis (Dawson, 2010), as proved with the failings of the Kyoto Protocol, cap and trade bill in the U.S., carbon tax in Canada, the Copenhagen summit or the Cancun summit. If anything these responses to the crisis further exacerbate the root causes and continue economic and political juggernauts. Rather, this great crisis of our time cannot find adequate solutions until a significant pressure is brought to bear, a greater pressure than that of the powerful corporate interests who currently influence our political landscape, a pressure that will only be realized through a globally linked, locally grounded movement of movements (Dawson, 2010). What some call a "great underground," this force finds common ground with social justice initiatives, Indigenous movements and environmental activism (Hawken, 2007). This is accomplished by understanding that climate change, like the term the "environment," does not exist in a vacuum, it is generated by our economic, political, cultural, historical and value-based pretexts, more specifically, it is a symptom of capitalism, elitism, globalization and free-marketism.

Therefore, in evolving the environmental movement to survive the 21st century and effect mass social change once more, we must evolve its conceptions of nature including the climate crisis to a more comprehensive analysis. Then and only then can we can find common ground in common solutions to common root causes. Nothing short of forming a revolution, this *life course of*

humanity will seek justice and integrity by not only reforming itself, but reforming the world order. An improbable task to many, however, it cannot be ignored that the current world system is inherently destructive and unsustainable. Continuing on this path will intensify the contradictions of a self-made ecocide, that of natural destruction and the human suffering associated with it. However, as these contradictions become increasingly apparent, it is the assertion of Ashley Dawson (2010) and of this paper, that so too resistance will rise and increasing participation will grow in this rising social force, as seen with greater number of activists being arrested in recent years (Quigley, 2011). In conclusion, while the science on climate change is apocalyptic, driving pessimism into the heart of any human being that has obtained the correct data, hope does exist in this hopeless age (Hawken, 2007; McKinley, 2008). The hope exists in the unnamed social-phenomenon that is a rising tide all around us, in every gesture of kindness, love, and compassion for fellow humans, non-humans and the very home that provides us all our existence, Earth.

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